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Abstract 
We model interhousehold transfers between nomadic livestock herders as the state-dependent 
consequence of individuals’ strategic interdependence resulting from the existence of multiple, 
opposing externalities.  A public good security externality among individuals sharing a social 
(e.g., ethnic) identity in a potentially hostile environment creates incentives to band together. 
Self-interested interhousehold wealth transfers from wealthier herders to poorer ones may emerge 
endogenously within a limited wealth space as a means to motivate accompanying migration by 
the recipient.  The distributional reach and size of the transfer are limited, however, by a resource 
appropriation externality related to the use of common property grazing lands. When this effect 
dominates, it can induce transfers from households who want to relieve grazing pressures caused 
by others’ herds.  Our model augments the extant literature on transfers, and is perhaps more 
consistent with the limited available empirical evidence on heterogeneous and changing transfers’ 
patterns among east African pastoralists. The core principles of our model possibly apply more 
broadly, for example to long-distance migrants or even among “foot soldiers” in street gangs. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars’ explanations of interhousehold transfers s ve as allegories for our understanding of 
human nature and the social environment that conditi s human behavior.  This topic has 
consequently been a source of dispute within most disciplines in the humanities and the social 
sciences.  Since at least the 17th century, philosophers have disagreed as to whether altruism is 
merely apparent, meaning that even states of mind that are directed towards the welfare of others 
ultimately aim at advancing one’s own pleasure (Hobbes 1650, Hobbes 1651, Butler 1726). 
Within anthropology, substantivists such as Scott (1976) have long argued that transfers arise 
from a “moral economy” in which prevailing ethical values such as generosity and individuals’ 
primordial right to subsistence assure support for he poor, while rationalists such as Popkin 
(1979) have countered that what appears to be a morl economy can be wholly explained by self-
interested, opportunistic individual behavior. A fierce debate likewise rages within contemporary 
theology on these questions, drawing on Mauss’ classic The Gift (1966) to argue whether humans 
ever undertake non-self-interested, non-manipulative g ing (Milbank 1997, Caputo and Scanlon 
1999).  Examples from other disciplines are not difficult to find. 
Economists have engaged this debate as well.  Some explain interhousehold transfers as 
the result of altruistic preferences or some sort of m ral code that constrains individual choice out 
of a sense of fairness ornoblesse oblige, perhaps complemented by the “warm glow” effects the 
giver enjoys from impure giving (Phelps 1975, Andreoni 1989, Samuelson 1993, Coate 1995, 
Smith et al. 1995, Kirchler et al. 1996, Barrett 1999). Others explain transfers as an endogenously 
supportable insurance mechanism adopted by purely self-interested individuals to cope with an 
environment of imperfect information and missing financial markets in which individuals interact 
repeatedly (Kimball 1988, Fafchamps 1992, Coate and Ravallion 1993, Townsend 1994, Platteau 
2000).  We accept the veracity of these two canonical models in explaining many interhousehold 
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transfers.  Surely some people provide insurance for one another and some can be gracious 
toward those who suffer in their midst.  However, the limited empirical evidence among the east 
African pastoralists we have been studying intensely for the past decade seems inconsistent with 
either explanation. 
This paper therefore develops an alternative model appropriate to the particular setting 
we seek to understand, but the core principles of which might apply elsewhere as well, as we 
discuss in the concluding section.  In our model, transfers are a self-interested, manipulative 
gesture motivated by the strategic interdependence of individuals sharing both access to a 
productive resource and a common social identity in a potentially hostile environment.  In our 
model, giving is intrinsically costly but can noneth less be instrumentally valuable to the giver if 
it motivates the recipient to undertake a self-interested action that has a positive spillover benefit 
for the donor. Put differently, transfers can serve as costly but desirable coordinating mechanisms 
among interdependent actors.   
This is explicitly not a model of pure altruism nor of impure altruism due to “warm glow 
effects” (Andreoni 1989), because individuals value only their own welfare and not the act of 
giving. Nor is this a model that relies on a patron-client relationship, in which marked inequalities 
in wealth, status or power give rise to vertical insurance systems or exchange of nontraded 
services (e.g., protection) for tradable goods and services such as material tribute or labor (Scott 
1976, Fafchamps 1992, Carter 1997, Platteau 1995).  In our model, no exchange of services 
occurs; redistribution occurs only with limited inequality in wealth and can be either 
distributionally progressive or regressive.  Finally, this is neither insurance nor investment in 
social capital, because ours is a static model in which transfers do not occur in response to 
idiosyncratic shocks to agents’ wealth or income and there is no opportunity for reciprocal 
behavior.  
In our model, a voluntary, self-interested wealth transfer is essentially a side payment for 
a migration decision the recipient only prefers x post, after having received the ‘gift’. While the 
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transfer may well strengthen the recipient’s inclinat on towards ‘cooperative’ behavior (Fehr et al. 
1997, Akerlof 1982) or elicit his penchant for reciprocity (Bowles et al. 1997), the ‘service’ the 
recipient offers – through the migration choice he makes – is unambiguously in his own interest. 
Like in the Bernheim et al. (1985) model of strategic bequests, the wealth transfer is strategic in 
that it influences the recipient’s choice of actions. Such transfers are manipulative in nature. But 
unlike the individually costly services – such as cre, visits, attention (Cox 1987, Bernheim et al. 
1985), sense of worth and status (Offer 1997), and remittances (Lucas and Stark 1985)1 – 
considered in prior investigations of exchange-based motives for private transfers, the service 
returned by the recipient to the giver in our model is not costly at all, as it merely originates in the 
externality effects generated by the recipient’s self-interested, post-transfer choice.2  
We motivate and situate our model in the context of east African pastoralists whose 
livelihoods depend on the extensive grazing of livestock. One novelty of the current study is that 
we identify how transfers can be risk reducing and/or productivity enhancing for the donor 
household.  As noted by many observers of pastoral economies, the area that a given user group 
calls its grazing area is frequently defined by ambiguous borders (Schlee 1989, Oba 1992, 
Goodhue and McCarthy 2000, Haro et al. 2005).  The flexible and contested nature of these 
boundaries creates an incentive for donor households t  support recipient households.  Donor 
households have an interest in ensuring that their own group maintains access to contested 
production areas and to repel attacks by other groups.  Insufficient livestock not only threatens a 
household with a food security crisis, but also threatens neighboring households with the potential 
loss of an ally in a hostile environment due to the existence of wealth thresholds that determine a 
household’s ability to migrate (Lybbert et al. 2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Santos and Barrett 2006b).  
As a result, progressive transfers may occur from riche  to poorer households.   
                                                
1 Like Lucas and Stark’s (1985) theory of remittance behavior, we view transfers as a mechanism for 
redistributing the gains from some jointly agreeabl action.  As a result, the transfers can endogenously 
vanish when the contract is no longer mutually beneficial.  
2 Our ‘service’ does share with some of the previous models the important feature of having no close 
market substitutes.   
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The production externality commonly assumed to exist in common property models is 
consequently not the full story of strategic interdependence.  This production externality must be 
balanced against a security externality that arises from the possibility that there is “safety in 
numbers”.  As many common property resource areas are vast and only loosely controlled by a 
state exercising police authority, concerns about security in such areas may be important.  
Yet common property resource externalities matter.  Indeed, as long as some basic level 
of public goods are provided in particular locations, such appropriation externalities may even 
give rise to modest, distributionally regressive transfers from poorer to wealthier households, 
although the empirical evidence of such transfers occurring is thin. We further argue that declines 
in mobility and transfers in pastoral areas of east Africa can be at least partly explained as the 
result of the exogenous local, provision of public goods.  As the state expands its reach into 
pastoral areas, it brings both security in the form f police forces and some low-level safety net in 
the form of food aid and other transfers.  These servic s are typically confined to areas around 
towns, leading subpopulations to become more reliant on exogenously supplied public goods, 
while others remain more reliant on the endogenous private provision of public goods.  A gradual 
reduction in transfers and mobility in pastoral societies could then be at least partially due to 
increased localized provision of public goods. Finally, our model offers insights into how the 
incomplete provision of public services can lead to non-convex production functions commonly 
associated with poverty traps. 
  
2. Background on East African Pastoralists  
We develop our model around our observations of livestock transfers between nomadic 
pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east Africa.  These pastoralists’ livelihoods 
depend almost entirely on extensive livestock production in regions subject to frequent drought 
and violent intergroup conflict.  Traditionally, ASL herders migrated with their herds in search 
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of pasture and water for their animals.  Herders suvived mainly by consuming the milk, meat, 
and blood of their herds.  Few permanent settlements xisted in pastoral areas in the pre-colonial 
and colonial eras. The few settlements that existed w re almost exclusively occupied by traders.  
Pastoral households would temporarily occupy areas near these trading points when conditions 
were favorable and move on as other areas become more favorable. 
The boundaries within which households moved were fl xible and contested.  The 
process of groups pushing into new areas or being pushed out of old areas was a constant fact of 
life.3  Areas that were accessible to members of a group at one point in time were not guaranteed 
to be accessible in the future.  Groups commonly raided others’ herds in order to augment their 
own wealth, particularly when there was ample grazing land and water available elsewhere to 
sustain larger herds.  Defense of a given area and of a group’s livestock was the responsibility of 
group members, as was the potential conquest of neighboring areas.  Membership in a social 
group was thus critical for ensuring access to grazing lands and security of one’s wealth. 
Group membership also involved access to a set of livestock transfer arrangements that 
occur almost exclusively within ethnic groups (Schneider 1979, Perlov 1987, McCabe 1987, 
Ensminger 1992, Little 1992).4 These transfers keep people who have lost their animals as mobile 
members of the group, thus enabling these members to continue to help provide for the common 
defense of herds and grazing areas.   
One of the main motivations for this study is that recent empirical work with household 
data gathered in pastoral areas yields some surprising conclusions with regard to transfer behavior 
that are difficult to reconcile with existing interpretations of transfers in the literature.  For 
                                                
3 See Sobania (1979) and Robinson (1984) for northern K nya examples. 
4 McPeak (2006) reports that 93% of transfers recorded among Gabra pastoralists in northern Kenya from 
1993-97 occur between individuals with a mother’s side, father’s side, or in-law relation.  Perlov (1987) 
describes the logic of exchange as a function of the social distance between the two parties.  As the rules 
governing transfer arrangements follow the rules of a given ethnic group, almost no exchange across ethnic 
frontiers occurs as there are no cultural institutions to allow such exchange.  Relatedly, marriage occurs 
within ethnic groups.  Marriage patterns can potentially foster strategic alliances across clans, but only
within groups that are already natural allies, not enemies.   
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example, the core predictions of a model of selfless giving would be that giving increases with 
wealth and transfers flow disproportionately to the poorest agents within the system. From an 
anthropological perspective, Maybury-Lewis (1992) describes transfers as following this logic- 
albeit with shame replacing altruism -  quoting a pastoral elder who stated that transfers occur 
since “we must give to those who need it, for a poor man shames us all” (p.85).   
This contrasts with contemporary empirical evidence on transfer behavior.  First, the 
evidence suggests that transfers do not go to the very poor.  Desta’s (1999) data show that among 
Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, the poorest and richest quartiles of herders were only 
one-sixth and one-fourth as likely, respectively, to receive livestock gifts or loans as the central 
half of the wealth distribution.  Santos and Barrett (2006a), using different data from the same 
population, similarly find that those with the smallest herds are statistically less likely to receive 
livestock transfers from other households. McPeak (2006) finds that relative wealth differences 
across households in a given period have very little quantitative impact on transfer flows.  In fact, 
some recent findings suggest that transfers at times flow from the poor to relatively better off 
(albeit still poor) households (Lybbert et al. 2004, Santos and Barrett 2006a).  Further, the sense 
of shame induced by having members of the society bcome poor is difficult to reconcile with the 
observable fact that the very poor are commonly abandoned, left to turn to begging, prostitution, 
and illicit drug and alcohol trade in grim rangeland towns (Little et al. 2001).   
A different interpretation in the anthropological literature stresses the risk sharing aspect 
of transfers. Transfers among pastoralists are clearly socially embedded behaviors that take place 
in a highly risky production system, which has natur lly led many observers to the conjecture that 
they represent a form of social insurance (Torry 1973, Schlee 1989, Oba 1992). Anthropological 
studies have described transfers using terms such as “an indigenous social security system” (Oba 
1992, p. 66) and “insurance against loss from drought, epidemics and human and animal 
predators…” (Schlee 1989, p.56).  
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Unfortunately, the informal insurance argument – the notion that transfers represent 
compensatory payments for idiosyncratic shocks among herders - likewise does not seem to offer 
a compelling explanation of the transfer patterns ob erved among contemporary pastoralists in 
east Africa. Recent econometric studies find that te flows involved are very small in relation to 
the losses suffered, not just in absolute terms but even relative to losses experienced within the 
relevant mutual insurance community.  Lybbert et al. (2004) find that Boran pastoralists in 
southern Ethiopia receive, on average, a gift or loan f only one head of cattle for every thirty 
livestock deaths beyond the community mean loss.  McPeak (2006) finds that herd growth has a 
quantitatively small impact on transfer flows, and if anything, transfers tend to go to herders who 
have experienced positive rather than negative herdgrowth in the year prior to the transfer. The 
compensation proportions found in these studies suggest that interhousehold stock transfers 
among pastoralists offer meager insurance against asset loss.5 This calls into question the 
completeness of insurance motives as an explanation for transfers in this setting.  
Furthermore, endogenous transfer patterns appear to h ve also changed significantly over 
the last three decades. Within pastoralist communities today, one hears informal reports that 
transfers have declined in frequency, scope and size over time. There also exists some indirect, 
empirical evidence, consistent with such reports. For Gabra herders in northern Kenya, Torry 
(1973) reports cumulative transfers per household since they began managing their herd 
independently averaging 17.8 camels out of the herd(12.0 camels into the herd) and 8.0 cattle out 
of the herd (2.6 cattle into the herd).  More than 20 years later in the same area, McPeak (2006) 
reports averages for this same composition of inventory measures for camels of 1.3 (1.2) and for 
cattle of 1.4 (2.0). A comparison between these twosets of figures is instructive, though 
admittedly imperfect since we cannot hold constant other factors, like the age distribution and 
length of time management of the interviewees. We derive similar suggestive evidence from the 
                                                
5 Nor does it seem that transfers have merely changed form, from livestock to money, food or other forms.  
Among northern Kenyan and southern Ethiopian pastorlists, interhousehold transfers of any kind are very
modest and not strongly related to the experience of sh cks (Lentz and Barrett 2005). 
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1980-97 herd history data used by Lybbert et al. (2004). The simple univariate regression of 
average gross household livestock transfers (the sum of the absolute value of transfers in and out) 
on a time trend variable yields a coefficient estima e of -0.147 cattle per year, with a p-value of 
0.012.  Both bits of evidence suggest the need for a framework to understand what factors could 
explain such declines in interhousehold transfers over time. This need is even more pronounced 
when one considers that models based on social insura ce and altruism would each predict 
increased transfers over time, since poverty and the amplitude of cattle cycles have both increased 
in the region over the past generation (Lybbert et al., 2004). 
Those who rely on altruism or mutual insurance models of transfers must therefore 
explain the apparent decline in interhousehold transfers as reflecting ‘moral decay’ or cultural 
decline. Of course, this begs the question of why such decay could have happened. Our model 
does not rely on vague notions of moral decay to explain declining transfers.  Rather, we 
hypothesize that major changes in the bio-physical and socio-economic environment of 
pastoralists in ASAL have induced the apparent, sharp decline in transfers.   In the present setting, 
we identify three key changes. Since the droughts of the early 1970’s, the provision of 
food aid to pastoral areas has become increasingly frequent and the growth of towns has 
been rapid.  Small towns that sprang up around relief distribution sites in the ASAL have 
rapidly expanded.  In the six northern Kenyan sites in which we work, no effort has been 
made at targeting households (Lentz and Barrett 2005).  Instead, identical food aid 
packages are given to all residents who request them and most households receive food 
aid every period.  So there is basically a lump sum payment made to those living in and 
around settlements in the form of exogenously provided food aid thus creating an 
incentive to be in or around towns.6  
                                                
6 As we discuss later, food aid flows in response to covariate rainfall shocks have also increased overthis 
period.  If these were well-targeted based on household-specific shocks, this could salvage the insurance 
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Another important change relates to the growing and now relatively high level of 
violence in the rangelands.  Livestock raiding between ethnic groups has long been a feature of 
pastoral areas (Bollig 1992, Markakis 1993, Hendrickson et al. 1996).7 However, over the past 
thirty years, the growth in ownership of small arms has made traditional conflicts over pasture, 
water, and livestock increasingly lethal as civil strife in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda 
has created an abundant supply of automatic weapons at low prices (Oba 1992, Hussein et al. 
1999, Osamba 2000, Smith et al. 2001).  Government security forces rarely are able to stop these 
conflicts in extensive grazing lands.  Whether due to lack of manpower, supplies, or interest, they 
more commonly concern themselves with security issue  in and around the small towns where 
they are posted.   Government provided security is largely a matter of protecting town dwellers, 
while nomadic households are left to defend themselve  as best as they can.  
The third key change is that pastoralist mobility is widely perceived to have deteriorated 
over the past generation or so due to loss of spatial refugia to expanding rangeland towns, to 
extensification of rainfed crop cultivation into traditional dry season grazing areas, to recently 
gazetted parks and protected areas, and to violently contested no-man’s-lands (Coppock 1994, 
Desta 1999, Fleisher 1999, Heald 1999). Mobility is key to wealth accumulation and conservation 
in the ASAL (Little 1992, McPeak and Barrett 2001, Lybbert et al. 2004) because microclimatic 
variability, soil and altitude differences, and uneven spatial distribution of animals give rise to 
patchy and time varying rangeland carrying capacity and productivity (Behnke et al. 1993, Ellis 
and Swift 1998).  Social identity matters as well to resource access and has become more fixed 
over time with the emergence of permanent town settlements. Much open rangeland and many 
                                                                                                                                      
explanation of declining transfers, due to the crowding out of private transfers by public ones.  But since 
household-level food aid receipts in this region are commonly lump sum transfers across households and 
uncorrelated with household wealth, income or idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks (Lentz and Barrett 
2005), these should not (and empirically, do not seem to) affect interhousehold transfers in response to 
idiosyncratic shocks.  Thus the puzzle remains. 
7  Cattle raiding and its attendant violence are occasionally inter-clan within some ethnic groups as well.  In 
this paper, for the sake of clarity, we simplify in assuming violence is solely between ethnic groups which 
is most common in the area we study.  
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watering points continue either unmanaged (open access) or governed by overlapping, “fuzzy” 
property rights (Goodhue and McCarthy 1999).  These areas are typically contested by multiple 
social groups.  Other, common property areas surrounding the towns are, by contrast, generally 
available only to members of a particular ethnic group or clan.   
In the following section, we develop a model that cptures and explains many of the facts 
just reported.  We illustrate the interconnectedness of herd mobility, herd size, and transfers and 
show how the localized provision of relief food and security can influence these relationships.  
This permits explanation of both the apparently striking change over time in transfer behavior 
among pastoralists and the current observed transfer patterns that appear consistent with neither 
prevailing economic theories of altruistic preferenc s nor of social insurance and reciprocity.   
 
3. A Model of Individual Migration Choice 
The analysis in this section focuses on a single agent’s binary decision over whether to migrate 
his herd or not and aims at elucidating the differential and conditional impacts of migration 
determinants.  This analysis is partly for its own sake, as it helps explain some stylized facts 
about pastoralism and apparent changes in the rangelands. It is also foundational, for in section 4 
we will generalize these behaviors to allow for thesimultaneous, strategically interdependent 
behaviors of multiple agents and allow the propositi ns with respect to migration derived in this 
section to inform our understanding of the evolution f interhousehold transfers among east 
African pastoralists. 
The essence of the model we present is that there exist two externalities, an appropriation 
externality associated with potential site-specific overgrazing – the classic “tragedy of the 
commons” effect – and a physical security externality reflecting “strength in numbers” effects 
vis-à-vis hostile common opponents.  Which of these ff cts dominates in a given setting depends 
on herd sizes across agents in different ethnic groups, the level of external transfers available, and 
 11 
prevailing ecological conditions on the range.  As we show in section 4, when the public security 
externality dominates, some agents may make limited s rategic asset transfers to somewhat poorer 
kinfolk in order to induce allies to migrate with tem to a potentially dangerous location.  When 
the appropriation externality dominates, some households may transfer wealth to kin in order to 
induce them to migrate away and thereby relieve pressures on the common property grazing area.  
Under certain assumptions, these transfers might even be regressive, flowing from poorer to 
richer households, although this phenomenon appears rare in practice. Overall, this model 
predicts precisely the sorts of current transfer patterns reported in the previous section, and can 
explain the shift over time that seems to have taken place in pastoralists’ interhousehold transfer 
behavior.  This framework is likewise consistent wih the common sociological observation that 
individuals sharing a common identity frequently appear as allies in one setting (e.g., when faced 
with a common adversary in distant locations) and as competitors in other domains (e.g., over 
scarce forage and water for their herds near their homelands). 
We structure the model in such a way as to underscore that neither insurance nor altruism 
could motivate the transfers that endogenously result.8  We use this structure not because we do 
not believe that altruism or insurance are factors in the complex reality of east African 
pastoralism, but rather to isolate this new mechanism we model, which seems to offer a 
conceptual reconciliation with the empirical evidenc  on east African pastoralists that extant 
models of transfers fail to provide.  
 
a. The agents and locations 
Consider a two-area setting (respectively, a base cmp near an established settlement, B, and a 
more distant satellite area, S). Define the livestock carrying capacity of each area },{ SBa∈ , 
denoted La
max(RFa), as the maximal number of animals that can be placed on that plot without 
                                                
8 The agents in our model are purely materially self-interested, so altruism plays no role. Also, ours is a 
static model, so insurance contracts cannot exist because there is no opportunity for reciprocation in future 
periods. 
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causing a decline in per animal productivity. We assume that areas are defined to be large enough 
that no single herder could feasibly manage a herd size equal to or greater than the carrying 
capacity in a given area.  Carrying capacity is thus only a potential constraint when there are 
multiple herds in a given area. Carrying capacity is increasing in the rainfall realizations on an 
area, RFa. Because herders in this region make migration decisions typically only after observing 
realized rainfall, thanks to word of mouth and/or reports from scouts sent out to prospect 
alternative grazing areas (O’Leary 1985, Oba 1992, Luseno et al. 2003), we assume that rainfall, 
while variable, is known; the model results are robust to making rainfall stochastic. Area-specific 
per animal productivity,9 fa(RFa)≥0, is assumed to be increasing and concave in realized rainfall.  
Satellite areas have higher intrinsic productivity than base areas, fS(RF)>fB(RF) for identical 
rainfall. For the same ecological reasons that productivity is higher there, satellite area carrying 
capacity exceeds base area carrying capacity for identical rainfall realizations, LS
max(RF) > 
LB
max(RF).  
Let there be three different herders representing two different, mutually hostile ethnic 
groups. Herders 1 and 2 share a common ethnic identity and are thus allies in any inter-ethnic 
conflict; herder 3 hails from the rival group.  The herd size distribut on {L1, L2, L3} is common 
knowledge. Each herder makes a discrete decision whether or not to migrate from his base camp 
area to the satellite area (m=1 for migration, 0 otherwise).10 Henceforth, we set m3 exogenously 
equal to 1. Thus, at the satellite area, there always exists a positive risk of inter-ethnic conflict. 
For the remainder of this section, we study herder 1’s migration choice, m1, conditional on the 
migration choice of herder 2, m2, and a given herd size of a rival group at the satllite area so as 
to be able to focus on the determinants of pastoralist migration. In the next section we relax this 
exogeneity assumption and explore the strategically interdependent migration decisions of the 
two herders and the distribution-conditional transfer regime that results endogenously.  
                                                
9  Productivity here reflects the production of consumption goods: milk, blood and meat.  
10 We assume that no herder can be prohibited from moving by other members of his clan.  If multiple 
herders each choose to move from one site to another, they necessarily do so together.   
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b. Appropriation and security externalities 
When the number of animals occupying an area exceeds its variable carrying capacity, 
productivity-degrading overgrazing results.  Hence, in the event of excessive resource 
competition, an appropriation externality arises, wherein one herder’s migration choice affects the 
productivity of other herders’ animals. The herders (sharing a common identity) in the base area 
thus become competitors. Let δa= (L
1
a+ L
2
a + L
3
a)/La
max(RFa) express the area-specific occupancy 
rate as a proportion of its rainfall-dependent carrying capacity.11 Then, we can define the 
expected proportional per animal productivity loss due to the appropriation externality as ηa(L
1
a, 
L2a, L
3
a, RFa) = (δa-1)/δa if δa ≥ 1 and  ηa = 0 if δa < 1.  This implies that herder 1’s expected 
productivity loss at the satellite area is weakly increasing in herder 2’s migration decision, ∂ηS 
/∂m2 ≥ 0.  Conversely, herder 1’s expected productivity loss at the base area is weakly decreasing 
in his kinsman’s migration decision, ∂ηB /∂m
2  
≤ 0. 
Production is increasing in area-specific growth potential and actual rainfall. The 
common property appropriation externality negatively affects the production function only when 
the area-specific carrying capacity is exceeded. In the absence of the common property 
externality,12 the pastoralist’s production is unambiguously increasing in individual herd size. 
Other herders’ migration decisions matter not only because of prospective resource 
competition but also due to possible security externalities.  If herders 1 and 2 both migrate to the 
satellite area, then because of inter-ethnic violence and/or livestock raiding they both risk a loss 
of animals.13  Denote this security risk, again expressed as an expected proportional per animal 
                                                
11 Note that by construction, L3B equals zero. 
12 Both Lybbert et al. (2004) and McPeak (2005) find empirical evidence that mortality and productivity, 
respectively, do not necessarily fall with increased livestock in an area, underscoring that appropriation 
externalities are not ubiquitous and may frequently be dominated by security externalities.  
13 Today, violence and raiding risk almost entirely exist in the satellite areas of the hinterland.  The town-
based provision of public security services in the form of police protection provides reasonable assurance 
against raiding losses around towns. We simplify this to perfect assurance in the model.  Prior to the 
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productivity loss, as θ Є [0,1]. At the satellite area, this security risk θ is a decreasing function of 
the aggregate herd size L1+L2. Intuitively, since security critically depends onhuman labor rather 
than herd size and given that treks are typically made in roughly fixed herder/herd size 
proportions, the larger the aggregate herd size, the more herders around to fend off the common 
enemy. There is strength in numbers in the sense that the presence of another member of a 
herder’s ethnic group reduces his expected losses du  to raiding and violence through a security 
externality. Hence, a common identity in the satellite area makes pastoralists allies.14 Without loss 
of generality, we assume that security risk θ = 0 at the base camp since the pastoralists who 
belong to a different social group never try to occupy the common property lands of another 
group and pastoralists of a s me social group never raid or act violently against each other. At the 
satellite area, the limiting case of θ = 0 only arises in the absence of violent raiding or if the rival 
group does not likewise occupy the area with its herd (m3 = 0). 
An important trade-off now emerges. On the one hand, if herders 1 and 2 both migrate, 
then the presence of more pastoralists from 1’s ethnic group may create a positive security 
externality against raiding.  On the other hand, it may also generate a negative resource 
appropriation externality, if and only if the resulting occupancy rate exceeds the area’s carrying 
capacity.   
 
c. Exogenous transfers and movement costs 
As mentioned in section 2, food aid has become nearly ubiquitous in the rangeland towns of the 
East African ASAL. We therefore introduce an exogenous transfer from outside the system, τ, 
which pastoralists only receive if they are at base camp, where they have ready access to town-
                                                                                                                                      
introduction of town-based public services a few generations ago, however, there was no practical 
distinction between base and satellite areas, so raiding threats were nearly omnipresent. 
14 The value of the security risk also increases withthe herd size of the rival group, L3. Furthermore, it 
reflects the availability and trafficking of weapons i  the region, political tensions between groups, and 
other factors that are unrelated to stocking rate pressures in the satellite areas of the rangelands.  We thus 
assume the two externalities are not directly linked, as it appears that little contemporary violence and
livestock raiding in this setting is in fact linked to competition for grazing area (Yirbecho et al. 2004). 
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based distribution of relief food.15 This geography of food aid distribution creates a cost to 
migration that, because, as mentioned earlier, treks are typically made in fixed herder/herd size 
proportions, is monotonically increasing in herd size.16 So if herder 1 chooses to leave the base 
camp for higher expected productivity satellite areas, he faces an opportunity cost of τ(L1), with τ’ 
> 0,. In addition to this cost of foregone food aid, the migrating pastoralist incurs variable 
movement costs, mc(L1), that are similarly monotonically increasing in herd size, with mc(0) = 0 
and mc’ > 0. This cost reflects the animal weight loss and riskof injury or loss to wild predators 
incurred on the migratory trek. 
   
d. The pastoralist’s migration choice 
We assume pastoralists maximize expected income conditional on others’ simultaneous choice 
(m2) that affects their payoffs.  Utility is assumed to be increasing in income and, at the time of 
deciding whether to migrate, the key environmental parameters that shape the appropriation and 
security externalities are known to all.17 The choice problem faced by pastoralist 1 is thus: 
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The first term of our expression for Y1 represents pastoralist 1’s payoff if he migrates to the 
satellite area, whereas the second term captures his payoff when staying at the base area. Both 
                                                
15 Since food aid distribution in the region is typically independent of a pastoralists’ wealth, we treat this as 
a lump sum that is identical for all pastoralists.  Our assumption that food aid is available only in the base 
camp is an obvious oversimplification.  The key feature is that leaving the satellite area to come to town to 
receive food aid entails a nontrivial fixed cost.  For simplicity’s sake, we model this cost as prohibitive. 
16 There are other prospective benefits to being neartown: access to markets and thus a wider variety of 
consumer goods, more timely information from the outside world, etc.  These other location-specific 
amenities merely reinforce the basic logic of our model, namely that the rise of localized provision of 
public services changes migration and transfer patterns. 
17 For expositional purposes, we present our model for the case of risk-neutral agents only. Risk aversion 
merely complicates the analysis without adding substantially different insights. 
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terms include an expression for the pastoralist’s effective herd productivity, defined as his ex ante 
herd size adjusted for the expected impacts of the appropriation and security externalities, 
multiplied by the site-specific per animal productivity.   
 
Pastoralist 1 then rationally decides to move to the satellite camp (m1 = 1) if and only if   
(2)    ( ) ( ) Ω≥− BBSS RFfRFf     
              where ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ){ } ( ) ( )
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The lefthand side of (2) reflects a measure of general migration appeal, common for all 
pastoralists facing the same migration choice. The value of Ω is individual-specific since it 
depends in part on agent 1’s individual herd size, L1. All else equal, this migration condition is 
more likely to be satisfied when τ(L1) and mc(L1) are small. This underscores how point-based 
free food aid distribution discourages migration, leading to increased herd concentration in base 
camp areas, an observation borne out empirically in the region (McPeak 2003). So in the absence 
of site-specific food aid transfers and variable movement costs, all pastoralists would move, as 
they did generations ago. But those costs of moving induce pastoralists with smaller herds to 
choose to stay at base camp and suffer lower productivity. More generally, however, the returns 
to migration depend fundamentally on m2, L1, L2, L3 θ, LB
max(RFB) LS
max(RFS), fB(RFB), fS(RFS), 
mc(.), and τ(.). 
Let us define the individual-specific migration threshold, L1*( m2, L2, L3 θ, LB
max(RFB) 
LS
max(RFS), fB(RFB), fS(RFS), mc(.), τ(.)) as the minimum herd size that makes migration to the 
satellite area preferable. In other words, L1* is the value for pastoralist 1’s herd size that makes his 
migration condition hold with equality: fS(RFS) -fB (RFB) = Ω
 (L1* ). In what follows, we let 
Ω(L1*) = fS(RFS) -fB (RFB) ≡ Ω*.  For any given combination of parameter values, production 
functions and migration strategies chosen by the otr herders, this specification generates a 
monotone, piecewise concave income function that is globally convex in herd size, with a kink 
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point at L1*.18  The resulting threshold effect implies that ceteris paribus pastoralists with a herd 
size below L1* find themselves in a low-level equilibrium of the sort described for this region 
empirically by Lybbert et al. (2004), McPeak and Barrett (2001) and Barrett et al. (2006).  
Now, wealthier pastoralists are more likely to migrate to the satellite area if and only if 
(3) 
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The righthand side of inequality (3) is necessarily positive, equaling zero if marginal migration 
costs are constant. The two terms on the lefthand side of inequality (3) correspond with the 
change in expected productivity caused by an incremental change in individual herd size 
respectively at satellite and base area. In the absnce of overstocking (i.e., 0/ 1 =∂∂ Lη ), the 
lefthand side of (3) is negative and hence the conditi  clearly holds. If the appropriation 
externality occurs in the base camp but not in the sat llite area, as is typically the case due to 
localized degradation (McPeak 2003) then inequality (3) still unambiguously holds.  In the more 
general setting where appropriation externalities exi t in both places, no fully general result 
exists.  An increase in herd size is more likely to trigger migration to the satellite area the larger 
(smaller) the induced change in the negative appropriation externality at the base (satellite) area, 
and the greater the corresponding change in the positive ecurity externality at the satellite area. A 
key assumption is 
ASSUMPTION 1: Differences in rangeland carrying capacity across satellite and base area 
are such that ( ) ( )


 −
∂
∂+−
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∂>>
∂
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LLL
ηθθηη 11
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18 The area-specific gross total products, PS and PB, and are indeed concave functions of L
1 given that θ is a 
convex function of L1 and that aggregate herd size, L1+L2, exceeds 2 under any realistic scenario.  
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Given the apparent empirical regularity among east African pastoralists that herd size is 
positively related to the probability of migration,19 we henceforth assume that the 
difference in rangeland carrying capacity between satellite and base areas is indeed great 
enough that wealthier pastoralists are ceteris paribus more likely to migrate than poorer 
pastoralists. This leads to the following propositin:  
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A marginal increase in individual herd 
size decreases the migration threshold. 
  Let us next evaluate how an increase in wealth of a (non)migrating ally influences one’s 
incentive to migrate. Two cases are separately considered: m2 = 1 and m2 = 0. Making use of the 
Implicit Function Theorem, we can rewrite the marginal effect of the herd size owned by one’s 
clansman on the individual’s migration threshold as: 
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In the case where m2 = 1, the numerator of (4) takes the form 
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while the denominator is 
(6)     
*1
*
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Given Assumption 1, the denominator is strictly positive. If in response to a marginal increase in 
2’s herd size at the satellite area, pastoralist 1 is more likely to migrate to the satellite area, then 
                                                
19 The simple bivariate correlation coefficient of L1 and m1 equals 0.352 using the 1560 observations of 
quarterly household-level data from Lentz and Barrett (2005).  See as well Little et al. (2001), McPeak and 
Barrett (2001), McPeak (2003), and Kaburo-Mariara (2003). It thus seems in data from the region that herd 
size and migration probability are indeed positively correlated. Using a game-theoretic model of migrat on 
and conservation Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder (1999) also lend theoretical support to the idea that richer 
herders are more likely to migrate to satellite grazing reserves.  
 19 
the migration decisions of both pastoralists are defined as strategic complements. Mathematically, 
strategic complementarity requires that 
(7)    
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In words, the positive security externality effect generated by an increase in pastoralist 2’  wealth 
(|∂θ/∂L2|) must outweigh the inextricable nonpositive approriation externality effect. If the 
rangeland conditions in the satellite area are such that the new occupancy rate is still less than its 
carrying capacity, then the requirement for strategic complementarity unambiguously holds and a 
marginal rise in wealth of pastoralist 2 generates only a positive public goods security exernality, 
enhancing pastoralist 1’s expected benefits from migrating. Conversely, in the absence of the risk 
of livestock raiding (θ = 0, and |∂θ/∂L2| = 0), the requirement for strategic complementarity will
never be satisfied. The corollary conditions for when the migration choices of pastoralist 1 and 2 
constitute strategic substitutes can be readily derived in an analogous fashion.  
In the case where m2 = 0, the numerator of (4) equals 
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Thus, a marginal increase in the herd size of the non-migrating pastoralist either leaves the 
migration decision of his fellow kin unaffected or l wers the latter’s migration threshold. In sum, 
we establish that:  
PROPOSITION 2: A marginal increase in the herd size of a migrating pastoralist 2 lowers 
pastoralist 1’s migration threshold if and only if the induced positive security externality 
effect outweighs the parallel negative appropriation externality effect. A marginal 
increase in the herd size of a non-migrating pastoralist 2 never raises pastoralist 1’s 
migration threshold.  
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 Change in external food aid transfers likewise affcts pastoralist 1’s migration behavior. 
By similar use of the Implicit Function Theorem, one can readily establish that a rise in food aid 
transfers unambiguously increases pastoralist 1’s migration threshold by increasing the cost of 
migration.20 As a consequence, the required minimal herd size to make migration attractive 
increases in the level of freely available food transfers.   
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in the total amount of freely available transfers raises 
pastoralist 1’s migration threshold. 
A marginal rise in pastoralist 3’s herd size (weakly) increases pastoralist 1’  migration threshold 
because it increases the risk of livestock loss (see footnote 12) and may affect productivity in the 
satellite area due to an appropriation externality.   
PROPOSITION 4: Pastoralist 1’s migration threshold is weakly increasing in the hostile 
pastoralist‘s herd size at the satellite area. 
Rainfall obviously influences pastoralist 1’s equilibrium migration strategy. Increased 
rainfall in the satellite area lowers pastoralist 1’  migration threshold because productivity away 
improves. A marginal increase in rainfall also increases the carrying capacity of the satellite area, 
possibly reducing ηS  and thereby creating further productivity gains. Conversely, if rainfall 
increases in the base area, pastoralist 1’s migration threshold increases because it stimulates base 
area livestock productivity both directly and indirectly by potentially mitigating local 
appropriation externalities by increasing the base area’s carrying capacity.21 In sum, 
microvariability in precipitation induces pastoralists to follow the rains, migrating if it falls in the 
satellite area, staying if it falls around the base camp. 
                                                
20 A formal proof of this and other omitted (but we blieve straightforward) claims to follow, all using the 
same Implicit Function Theorem technique that led to Proposition 2, are available on request from the 
authors. 
21 Higher rainfall in the base area diminishes [fS(RFS) -fB (RFB)]  by a factor which is greater than the 
induced reduction in the value of  Ω. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, increased rainfall in the base area makes 
it less likely that the migration condition is fulfilled. 
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If the marginal change in rainfall is uniformly distr buted across both the satellite and 
base areas, as often happens in time of drought, then, since fS(RF) >fB (RF), any incremental 
change in rainfall (∆) increases fS(RFS+∆) - fB(RFB+∆) at a decreasing rate. Rainfall also affects Ω.. 
In sum, a uniform marginal increase in rainfall at both satellite and base areas generates a 
downward shift in the pastoralist 1’s migration threshold.   
PROPOSITION 5: A marginal change in rainfall favoring the satelli  (base) area induces 
a downward (upward) shift in pastoralist 1’s migration threshold. Pastoralist 1’s 
migration threshold falls in response to a spatially uniform change in rainfall. 
The final relation we seek to establish in this section relates to change in the security risk 
parameter, θ.  An increase in the exogenous risk of raiding, perhaps due to the spread of modern 
weaponry, or to increased interethnic tensions due to political disputes, diminishes pastoralist 1’s
expected payoff from migrating and thus dampens his propensity to migrate.   
PROPOSITION 6: An increase in the exogenous risk of raiding generates an upward shift 
in pastoralist 1’s migration threshold. 
The insights summarized in these six propositions lay the foundation for the next section, 
which explores transfer choices as the rational outcome of pastoralists’ strategic interdependence 
through both appropriation and security externalities. The tradeoffs between risk of violence and 
livestock raiding and stocking rate pressures on comm n property rangelands create a limited 
space in which livestock transfers occur.  The pattern of these transfers reflects particular 
combinations of ecological conditions, ex ante herd distributions, external transfer volumes, and 
the exogenous probability of violence. This matches the empirical evidence on east African 
pastoralists that extant theories cannot readily explain.   
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4. Two-person non-cooperative migration game 
The preceding section treated the decision of pastor list 1 in isolation from the simultaneous, 
interdependent choice of the other pastoralist so a to better understand the nature and 
determinants of the crucial migration choice.  In this section, we treat the two pastoralists’ 
decisions as a sequential, noncooperative game of transfer followed by migration choices in order 
to tease out the conditions under which transfers emerge in equilibrium in the absence of altruism 
or repeated interactions that might permit endogenously enforceable informal insurance contracts. 
 The intuition of the results we develop runs as follows. The larger an individual’s herd, 
the greater the incentive to migrate to the satellite area, ceteris paribus. When stocking rate 
pressures on the open range are low or nonexistent and there is real risk of livestock raids, a 
relatively wealthy, migrating pastoralist may then benefit from manipulating a poorer ally’s 
independent migration choice by transferring animals to him and thereby inducing him to move 
voluntarily, and thus to fight alongside the bigger h rder against their common foe.22  However, 
some pastoralists are so poor that the transfer necessary to induce them to migrate is excessive 
relative to the security externality benefits the walthier herder would enjoy.23   
 As a consequence, the resulting egalitarian transfers are limited in two crucial senses.  
First, they are limited to the transfer level necessary just to bring one’s ally to his migration 
threshold and thereby induce him to move – and fight – alongside the donor.24  Thus transfer 
volumes are small.25 Second, they are limited only to ally households that are below but 
reasonably near the migration threshold, so that the security externality benefits can justify the 
                                                
22 While one herder may try to induce another herder to accompany him in his trek to the satellite area, it is 
assumed that nobody has the capacity to exclude any group member from moving with him. We thus rule 
out the possibility that a poor herder must pay a richer ally for ‘protection’ during his move.  
23 This is why herders do not induce poorer herders to trek with them using non-livestock transfers.  The 
transfer required to induce migration is too expensive, whether paid in the form of animals or non-livestock 
assets (e.g., cash, food).   
24 Note that if the herder refuses to accept the transfer offered by the donor, then his outside option is to 
stay in the base area. Hence his threat point is defined by his expected utility from staying when theother, 
richer group member nevertheless prefers to move out. 
25 Santos and Barrett (2006a) report that 91% of livestock transfers in this region were of just one animal 
and less than 2% were of more than two animals. 
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cost of the animals given away.  One outcome is that the poorest members of the ethnic group do 
not receive internal transfers (just external transfers of food aid), have herd sizes too small to 
migrate, and are consequently trapped in a relativey low productivity equilibrium.  
This gives rise to a second, distinct type of manipulative transfer. If overstocking 
pressures are significant around the base areas, some pastoralists may find it in their interest to 
transfer an animal to another herder whose ex ante herd size lies just below his migration 
threshold, so as to induce the recipient to move and thereby increasing the productivity of the 
remainder of the donor’s herd. If the probability of migration is increasing in herd size, such 
transfers to induce others to vacate shared rangelads round a base camp will typically be 
regressive, from poorer herders to slightly wealthier ones, although in principle such transfers 
could be to anyone.  Still, this gives us a candidate explanation for the (infrequent) observation of 
modest regressive livestock transfers among east African pastoralists.26 There thus exist state-
dependent interdependencies between migration choices undertaken by pastoralists sharing a 
common social identity, manipulative interhousehold transfer behaviors, and low-level 
productivity equilibria for pastoralists trapped in a d around rangeland towns. 
Without loss of generality, let 1 be the wealthier of the two herders in the same ethnic 
group (L1 ≥ L2).    Given the discrete, simultaneous migration decision by these two agents, in 
theory there exist four different combinations of migration strategies that can possibly emerge. 
However, Proposition 1 rules out one of these possibilities because if 1 does not choose to 
migrate, then neither will 2 move because migration incentives are increasing in herd size.  Figure 
1 depicts the feasible strategy space of three migration/no migration combinations. 
The problem, from pastoralist 1’s perspective, is now one of maximizing expected 
income subject to the independent choice of pastoralist 2.  Each of the two herders is 
                                                
26 One likely reason for the infrequency of such transfers would be the coordination problem that exists 
when one generalizes beyond the two person game setting we employ here.  Since inducing those nearest 
their migration threshold to move so as to relieve pr ssure on the commons is a public good, there exist
incentives to free ride.   
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simultaneously solving the migration choice problem in (1).  The key now is to recognize that 
their common social identity can create an incentiv for either 1 or 2 to offer his fellow group 
member a side payment in the form of an interhousehold livestock transfer, in order to induce the 
other to migrate. To be more precise, 1’s migration choice now becomes 
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where β12 is the transfer from 1 to 2, chosen by 1 only if m
1=127 Intuitively, β12>0 only when the 
transfer is necessary and sufficient to induce 2 to migrate (that is, when herder 2’s incentive 
compatibility constraint is satisfied), and when the security benefits to 1 of 2’s migration 
outweigh the costs of both relinquishing wealth and potentially aggravating the resource 
appropriation externality in the satellite area (that is, when herder 1’s rationality constraint is 
satisfied).  The minimum transfer necessary to induce 2 to move will be β12
min=max(L*2|m
1
=1 –L
2, 
0).28 Clearly, if herder 2 already owns sufficient livestock so that he benefits from migrating to 
the satellite area irrespective of whether he is given additional animals, there is no need for 1 to 
make a transfer: β12
min=0. If, however, L2 is sufficiently small that without the transfer 1 believes 
that m2*=0, then a stock transfer may be in 1’s interests.  Define β12
max as the transfer level that 
would leave herder 1 indifferent between making a transfer and moving to the satellite area alone.  
Obviously β12
max> 0 if and only if strategic complementarity exists, i.e., if 2’s presence in the 
satellite area confers more security benefits than it costs in resource competition.   
Put these two conditions together and equilibrium positive transfers must fall in the 
interval [β12
min, β12
max].  No transfers result if β12
max< β12
min or β12
min=0. This is the sense in which 
transfers are limited in volume and can exclude both the poorest and richest pastoralists under 
contemporary conditions.  If the migration threshold is reasonably high, perhaps because food aid 
                                                
27 We will shortly consider the possibility of β21= - β12, but abstract from this for the moment. 
28 Note that pastoralist 2’s migration threshold (L*2|m
1
=1) is, like before, defined by inequality (2), but now 
takes into account pastoralist 1’s reduction of his herd size following the minimal transfer. 
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distribution is significant, carrying capacity is low and security risks are great, then the necessary 
transfer to induce 2’s migration may well exceed 1’s reservation transfer level.  We conjecture 
that over time, the changes in the east African ASAL have caused [β12
min, β12
max] to shrink, 
thereby explaining why significant past interhousehold transfers have fallen markedly.   
Although transfers will only occur among pastoralists of the same social identity, they 
need not always be distributionally progressive.  If either herder is willing to migrate based on his 
ex ante herd size, then β12>0 is a possible transfer in equilibrium. This result obtains because 1 
will always be willing to migrate when 2 is willing to migrate, since the only difference in their 
choice problem is their ex ante herd size and, by proposition 1, the migration thres old is 
decreasing in herd size.  However, if neither 1 nor 2 have ex ante herd sizes sufficient to justify 
migration, the possibility of regressive equilibrium transfers arises.  The logic depends on the 
notion of strategic substitutes, as defined in the previous section.  If herd sizes in the base camp 
area are sufficient to induce significant appropriation externalities and pastoralist 1’s herd size 
falls just below his migration threshold, then a livestock transfer from the poorer household, 2, to 
the richer-but-still-poor household, 1 may be mutually beneficial.29  Somewhat more formally, 
the minimum transfer necessary to induce 1 to move would be β21
min= max(L*1|m
2
=0 –L
1, 0).  Now 
define β21
max as the transfer level that would leave herder 2 indifferent between making a transfer 
intended to induce 1 to exit the base camp common property and sharing those grazing areas in 
spite of the overstocking pressures.  Strategic substit tability is necessary but not sufficient for 
β21
max > 0, just as strategic complementarity is necessary but not sufficient for β12
max > 0.  If the 
transfer necessary to induce 1’s migration is no greater than the maximum transfer 2 is willing to 
                                                
29 In theory, variable returns to scale – initially increasing, then decreasing – could also give rise to the 
coexistence of progressive and regressive transfers. One would see the regressive transfers at the low end of 
the wealth distribution, as poor herders seek to hand over their herd to the bigger herders, and the 
progressive at the upper tail as the wealthy herders reduce their herds through transfers to smaller 
neighbors.  We know of no empirical evidence to support the variable returns hypothesis in this setting, 
however, and each of the several animal scientists we asked discounted this explanation as highly unlikely.  
Among other reasons, there would exist serious agency problems (the transferee could sell or slaughter t  
extra animals and simply claim they were eaten by wildlife predators), as similarly reflected in the lack of 
any significant hiring of herders (unlike in West Africa). 
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make to have the base camp grazing area to himself, th n a regressive transfer in the interval 
[β21
min, β21
max] can take place in equilibrium.  
Furthermore, if both 1 and 2 have ex ante herd sizes sufficient to justify migration 
provided they migrate together, then the possibility of regressive equilibrium transfers arises. The 
transfer then serves as a way of eliminating the possibility of a coordination failure: pastoralist 2 
offers 1 just enough cattle to ensure that the latter migrates irrespective of 2’s decision. Formally, 
the minimum transfer to induce 1 to move regardless of 2’s actions would be β21
min’= max(L*1|m
2
=0 
–L*1|m
2
=1, 0). Now define β21
max’ as the transfer level that would leave herder 2 indifferent between 
making a transfer intended to induce 1 to exit the base camp common property whether she 
migrates or not, and staying on the base camp. If then he interval [β21
min’, β21
max’] is nonempty, 
then a regressive transfer will take place in equilibrium. 
Let us now summarize the feasible options in strategy space.  First, we briefly consider 
one other situation, namely when θ = 0, wherein the only manipulative transfers that could exist 
in equilibrium would be regressive transfers meant to relieve the resource appropriation 
externality in the base area.  These will necessarily only be offered if 2’s gift induces 1 to migrate 
while 2 remains at the base camp (m1 = 1, m2 = 0). In this setting, transfers represent a Coasian 
mechanism to resolve the resource appropriation externality.  Such regressive transfers could, in 
theory, occur regardless of the size of the security risk in the satellite area.  However, because 
L*1|θ>0 ≥ L*
1
| θ=0 following Proposition 4, β21
min
| θ>0 ≥ β21
min
| θ=0.  In words, the transfer necessary to 
induce 1 to vacate the base area is necessarily larger when 1 xpects to then incur a greater 
livestock loss at the satellite area.  This necessarily implies that regressive transfers to a 
pastoralist who then has to fight for his grazing land are both less likely and, when they occur, 
larger than regressive transfers to those who do not ultimately have to fight. 
The more likely possibility for limited progressive manipulative transfers arises when L1 
≥ L*1. Strategic transfers within a social group may be mutually advantageous to 1 and 2. 
Progressive interhousehold transfers intended by 1 to induce 2 to migrate and fight alongside him 
 27 
necessarily occur only if both parties ultimately move to the satellite area, fostering ethnic 
conflict over scarce resources (m1 = m2 =1), as shown in Figure 2.  Note, however, that in 
principle one could see regressive transfers becaus the security externality creates a coordination 
game best resolved by a small transfer from the poorer herder to the wealthier one so as to ensure 
that 1 migrates regardless of 2’s choice. 
Figure 3 depicts the relevant β12
min and β12
max curves for a given set of parameters {L1, L2, 
L3, RFa, fa(.), θ, τ}.  The shaded area reflects the set of feasible progressive transfers in 
equilibrium, which depends on how 1 and 2 interact. For ease of exposition, we hereafter assume 
1 chooses β12 unilaterally, subject to satisfying 2’s incentive compatibility constraint to migrate, 
implying that β12= β12
min. 30 As defined earlier, β12
min is a linear, decreasing function of L2 with unit 
slope in absolute value that is positive only below L* 2.31 The willingness-to-transfer function, 
β12
max, can never be positive below L*1, and is concave in L1 thereafter, increasing so long as the 
marginal change in the appropriation externality is dominated by the marginal change in the 
security externality, thus increasing expected per animal productivity for 1:  
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The result is that not only are transfers limited to within the social group, but the fact that β12
max is 
decreasing in L1 beyond some threshold point and that β12
min is decreasing in L2 limits the wealth 
space within which progressive interhousehold transfers occur.  The poorest pastoralists (those in 
the neighborhood of L2=0 in Figure 2) receive no wealth transfers and the biggest herders make 
no transfers.  This is a limited rational egalitarianism in which distributionally progressive 
transfers flow from an “upper middle class” to a “lower middle class” as a result of agents’ 
                                                
30  Given a finite set of fellow community members, however, 2 may enjoy some bargaining power and be 
able to extract a greater transfer, although never beyond the β12
max individual rationality constraint imposed 
by 1’s choice problem.  We leave this bargaining game refinement to future work. 
31 Recall from section 3 that the exogenous factors, including the ex ante herd distribution, determine L*2 by 
establishing the differential range productivity, fixed and variable movement costs, and the range 
appropriation and physical security externality values.  So β12
min changes with those parameters too. 
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identity-dependent strategic interdependence.  This model thus yields empirically testable 
hypotheses that contrast with both the insurance model prediction, where net transfers covary 
positively with asset shocks but are unrelated to wealth, and with the prediction of the canonical 
altruism model, where net transfers are monotonically increasing in wealth.  We leave for future 
work empirical investigation to try to identify what proportion of observed transfers is best 
explained by each model.  
The set [β12
min, β12
max] may be empty.  Figure 3 depicts how a decrease in Ls
max, the 
satellite area carrying capacity, might extinguish transfers in equilibrium.  Because security risks 
increase in the satellite area, L*1 and L*2 both increase, per proposition 3, and the resource 
appropriation externality effect becomes more pronounced, diminishing the prospective benefits 
to 1 of a migration by 2.  Relative to the base case depicted in Figure 3, this increases β12
min and 
decreases β12
max for any {L1, L2}, potentially extinguishing herder 1’s incentive to manipulate 2’s 
migration choice through a stock transfer.  
A situation where no equilibrium transfers occur is more likely to arise as the exogenous 
risk of raiding parameter increases, the carrying capa ity at the satellite area decreases (leaving 
no scope for cases where the induced positive security externality surpasses the negative 
competition externality), the base-satellite productivity differences are low and the level of food 
transfers is high. Such parameter value shifts reflect the stylized changes over the past generation 
in conditions on the east African rangelands described in section 2 and may help explain the 
apparent reduction in interhousehold transfers observed among pastoralists there.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Although models of interhousehold transfers have long fascinated economists and other social 
scientists, the extant workhorse models based on altruism or mutual insurance appear insufficient 
to explain some patterns of transfers and of intertemporal change in those behaviors.  We 
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illustrate this in the case of east African pastoralists and use that case to motivate an alternative, 
complementary model of transfer behavior.  By construction, we rule out altruism and mutual 
insurance as possible explanations.  Yet multiple ext rnalities, in our case related to security and 
common property use, give rise to strategic complementarities inducing voluntary unrequited 
transfers in some states of nature, and in other states to strategic substitutability extinguishing 
incentives to make transfers.  The model thereby predicts transfers that are limited in frequency, 
scope, size and distributional reach, and at times flow from poorer to richer households. These 
characteristics are consistent with the empirical evidence among east African pastoralists, which 
cannot be reconciled with models based on altruism or utual insurance.  
 Our model can also explain the observed decline of transfers in the region as a natural 
byproduct of changing environmental conditions – in our example, increased town-based 
provision of food aid, diffusion of lethal small arms resulting in increased inter-group violence, 
and reduced rangeland carrying capacity – that exogen usly affect transfer incentives.  Reduced 
transfers therefore need not reflect cultural or moral decline, as would be true under canonical 
altruism- or insurance-based models of interhousehold transfers. Although the hypotheses 
generated by our model are the only ones we can find that are consistent with the mass of 
ethnographic, range science and economic evidence on which we draw, they are unfortunately not 
directly testable with available data.  Nor would we expect new data to shed much light on this 
phenomenon since we are trying to explain an important phenomenon that has largely vanished, it 
seems.   
 The theoretical model nonetheless provides an altern tive, integrated understanding of 
pastoralists’ migration and interhousehold transfer b havior with significant policy implications. 
Interventions can change the biophysical and socioeconomic environment in which pastoralists 
make migration and transfer choices, perhaps inducig a renaissance in progressive 
interhousehold transfers or maybe (unintentionally) further discouraging such acts.  Our model 
suggests that the provision of town-specific public services – modeled here as police protection 
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and food aid distribution – induces a natural decline in private giving. While welfare may be 
increased due to the provision of public services and external transfers and the displacement 
effect need not be one for one, the incentives to undertake manipulative transfers decline.  These 
incentives could be reversed through other public investments not yet taken.  In particular, 
interventions to reduce inter-group violence – e.g., through serious conflict resolution 
intermediation efforts or the geographic expansion of police protection – and to maintain or 
increase rangeland carrying capacity through improved water and range management could 
stimulate pastoralist mobility, which remains the key to welfare and wealth accumulation among 
these peoples, and thereby encourage renewal of progressive interhousehold transfers. 
 The core principle of our model – that transfers may be state-conditional, rational 
responses to identity-dependent strategic complementarities between agents affected by one or 
more externalities – and the issue of endogenous provision of security when people identify 
themselves with distinct social groups both apply more widely than just to the very specific 
context of east African pastoralism.  We now briefly propose two concrete, alternative settings 
where variants of the mechanism modeled here may well apply and merit further exploration.   
 First, consider two different illustrative cases of j int human migration across long 
distances.  One involves skilled workers moving from developing countries to foreign lands who 
often provide a self-serving transfer (e.g., a plane ticket) to a poorer clanswoman so as to induce 
her to migrate with them and subsequently provide child care services that are otherwise available 
in the destination city.  The reason is often a desire to preserve the child’s natal culture and 
language, i.e., security against cultural erosion, as reflected in the fact that such behaviors appear 
(very casually) more likely the fewer countrymen the skilled migrant expects to find in the 
destination and the more alien or even hostile the host culture.  Further, such transfers appear less 
likely the greater the crowding that would result from co-residence with the poorer child care 
provider. Similarly, migrants from rural villages often use transfers to induce a neighbor or 
kinsman to migrate with them to a distant city where having a friend and ally can provide 
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valuable security in an otherwise-insecure setting if one does not have reliable prior contacts in 
the destination, but can also create competition for living space, employment, etc.  In both cases, 
trade-offs between security and a common resource externality can help explain the emergence, 
under particular environmental parameters, of strategic complementarities that induce transfers 
that appear neither altruistic nor due to mutual insurance.  
 The other example we offer, less straightforward but equally compelling, is that of “foot 
soldiers” in a street gang engaged in illegal activities such as drug sales or prostitution. Gang 
members have an incentive to band together so as topro ect their turf against rival gangs.  But 
because they are also competitors for a limited resource (e.g., prospective customers, social 
standing), this creates (at least pecuniary) externalities. So long as the former externality 
dominates, there is an incentive to give costly gifts – drugs, weapons, money, a uniform, etc. – to 
induce a prospective member to join the gang, but not for altruistic or mutual insurance reasons.   
 These examples illustrate how tradeoffs between a neg tive common property externality 
and a positive security externality in common propety settings may affect behaviors of 
widespread interest and be more widespread than is currently appreciated.  When weak states are 
unable or unwilling to provide security services, individuals must resolve that state failure 
through non-market coordination mechanisms that rely h avily on group identity.  The need to 
endogenously provide security influences economic behavior.  Such insights may help resolve 
some behavioral puzzles, including but not only the case of interhousehold transfers among east 
African pastoralists. 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Transfers Conditional on Optimal Ex Post Migration Choices  
(cell entries are the value of the transfer) 
 
  
m1 = 0 
 
m1 = 1 
m2 = 0 0 
Regressive transfers 
0 if β21
min = 0 or if 
[β21
min>0,β21
max] = Ø 
 [β21
min, β21
max] otherwise  
m2 = 1 . 
Regressive transfers 
0 if β21
min’ = 0 or if 
[β21
min’>0,β21
max’] = Ø 
 [β21
min’,β21
max’] otherwise 
Progressive transfers 
0 if β12
min=0 
[β12
min,β12
max]otherwise 
 
Note: Without loss of generality, let 1 be the wealthier of the two herders in the same ethnic group (L1 ≥ L2). 
Also, let Assumption 1 hold.     
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Figure 2: Limited Progressive Transfers in Equilibrium 
(conditional on m1 = 1, and θ>0) 
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Figure 3: No Equilibrium Transfers 
(conditional on m1 1, and θ>0) 
Li*new 
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L2 = 0, 
L1 > 0 
L1 = 0, 
L2 > 0 L
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